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ABSTRACT. Recent work on the epistemology of moral deference suggests that moral 
knowledge must derive from a knower’s own ability in a way that knowledge acquired easily 
through testimony need not. This paper transposes this idea to the collective level, and in doing 
so, shows how two leading accounts of collective knowledge, the joint acceptance account and 
the distributed account, would be best positioned to countenance group-level moral knowledge 
as knowledge creditable to group-level ability. The upshot is that we uncover some hitherto 
unnoticed puzzles to do with defeat in collective moral epistemology, puzzles which reveal 
collective moral knowledge to be surprisingly fragile vis-à-vis higher-order defeat compared to 
individual-level moral knowledge. A consequence of this disanalogy is that more work needs 
done if non-skeptical collective moral epistemology is to hold water.   
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
According to a popular view in individual moral epistemology called pessimism, there is something 
deeply problematic about believing a moral proposition purely on the basis of another’s say so (e.g., 
Jones 1999; Nickel 2001; Driver 2006; Hopkins 2007)1. For example, there is something amiss with 
believing that cruelty is wrong because your teacher told you so, but for no other reason. 
 Though pessimists disagree amongst themselves about why moral deference is problematic, 
a point of agreement is that believing a moral proposition purely on the basis of moral testimony 
violates an epistemic norm governing belief. Robert Hopkins (2007) articulates such a norm as 
follows: 
Grasping norm (GN): You (epistemically) should believe a moral proposition only if you 




 Because a grasp of the moral grounds of a proposition can’t be straightforwardly transmitted 
from speaker to hearer via testimony2, some pessimists reason from GN that moral knowledge can’t 
be acquired via testimony at all. For our purposes, we remain agnostic on this point.3 What we take 
to be more interesting, from an epistemological point of view, is what GN implies more generally 
about what moral knowledge demands. 
 On one way of thinking, knowledge, per se, doesn’t require grasping grounds4, and so it 
follows from GN that there is no such thing as moral knowledge because nothing corresponding 
with (mere) knowledge is normatively constrained in this demanding way; yet, whenever GN is 
satisfied, one is in the market for moral understanding, for which such a grasp is essential.5 An 
alternative route open to pessimists is to maintain that knowledge, generally, doesn’t require 
grasping grounds, however, it does require this in the special case of moral knowledge.6 
 Our main interest here is not to adjudicate this dispute. Rather, we will investigate how the 
foregoing predicament that gives rise to it also generates some interesting and hitherto unnoticed 
epistemological puzzles when transposed to the collective level, particularly with regard to the 
relationship between collective moral knowledge, disagreement, and defeat. 
 Here is the plan for the paper. §2 sharpens the foregoing problem in individual epistemology 
and argues that if there is moral knowledge, then it plausibly involves what robust virtue 
epistemologists (e.g., Greco 2010; 2012; Sosa 2009; 2015) call cognitive achievement, or cognitive 
success (e.g., true belief) creditable to the exercise of cognitive ability. An implication of this 
‘achievement’ requirement on individual moral knowledge is that it is, at least in principle, more 
easily defeated than otherwise, given that more is required to retain moral knowledge than non-
moral knowledge. However, this apparent fragility is not particularly worrying at the individual 
level. This is because, as we will show, individual-level abilities that give rise to achievements are 
generally stable. 
 Interestingly, as we will see, things are different at the collective level. In §3, we take, as a 
starting point that if there is collective moral knowledge, then it must plausibly be primarily 
creditable to (collective) ability.7 But what does this involve? In §4, we taxonomise two mainstream 
accounts of collective knowledge, the joint acceptance model and the distributed model, and then, 
in each case, we show how the idea that collective moral knowledge requires collective achievement 




extremely fragile; it is only difficult to acquire 8 , but much easier than other kinds of group 
knowledge to defeat. 
 
II. (INDIVIDUAL) MORAL KNOWLEDGE, CREDIT AND DEFEAT 
The metaethical anti-realist might respond to pessimist’s key idea by trying to undermine the initial 
puzzle motivating it. Perhaps there is no moral knowledge. This might be because surface-level 
moral claims are categorically false (i.e., error theory9) or non-truth evaluable (i.e. non-cognitivism). 
If this is right, then it’s no wonder that something seems amiss about gaining moral knowledge 
through testimony. Epistemic anti-realist views that respond to the initial puzzle this way are 
committed to skepticism about moral knowledge (and, more generally, to skepticism about any kind 
of evaluative knowledge as it is traditionally (i.e., realistically) construed10). An assumption we will 
be making in what follows is non-skeptical: that moral knowledge, realistically construed, is 
possible, and that there is at least some moral knowledge. 
 With this assumption in play, let’s focus in on what moral knowledge might involve over 
and above what non-moral knowledge involves. The most natural general answer is: a certain kind 
of ability not required by non-moral knowledge. Why? First, ‘ability’ is the sort of thing that can’t 
be transmitted simply through testimony. (Consider: David Gilmour can tell you how to play a guitar 
solo; it doesn’t follow that you are thereby able to play that guitar solo.11) Second, grasping grounds 
implicates not only something that non-moral knowledge doesn’t essentially involve, but an ability 
non-moral knowledge doesn’t essentially involve.12 Thirdly, if moral knowledge requires more by 
way of ability than non-moral knowledge, then this could help us to make sense of an important data 
point about the relationship between moral knowledge and moral action, to wit, that the moral 
goodness of an action plausibly depends not only on doing the right thing, but also on doing it for 
the right kind of reason. If moral knowledge, as such, requires abilities beyond what non-moral 
knowledge requires13, then we can easily make sense of the idea that moral knowledge is important 
to morally good action. If moral knowledge lacked any such abilities, then this connection would be 
harder to explain. 
 Granted, if all knowledge demands a lot of us by way of ability, then it would be hard to see 




in particular—robust virtue epistemology—according to which all knowledge has to be primarily 
creditable to ability.14 As John Greco (2003) succinctly puts it: 
To say that someone knows is to say that his believing the truth can be credited to him. It is 
to say that the person got things right due to his own abilities, efforts and actions, rather than 
due to dumb luck, or blind chance, or something else (2003, 116). 
 This view has a number of well-known advantages, not least that it offers an elegant way to 
deal with standard Gettier cases.15 However, one of the main disadvantages of this kind of ability-
heavy view of knowledge is that it is too strong to reconcile with the prevalence of testimonial 
knowledge gained cheaply—e.g., by trusting a reliable source in the absence of defeaters. A point 
notably made by Jennifer Lackey (e.g., 2007) is that in paradigmatic cases of testimonial knowledge 
exchange (e.g., as when one asks for directions in a new town), it should be the testifier rather than 
the testimonial recipient who deserves the credit (if anyone does) for the recipient getting things 
right when they do.16 
 While testimony cases pose a serious obstacle for robust virtue epistemology as a general 
account of knowledge simpliciter, they offer an interesting vantage point to appreciate just how 
closely two things line up together: (i) moral knowledge, which we’ve shown plausibly requires 
ability in a way that non-moral knowledge does not; and (ii) knowledge simpliciter which, according 
to robust virtue epistemology, also requires the exercise of ability in a way that (as we’ve seen) is at 
tension with the thought that some knowledge is easily transmittable via testimony. 
 A plausible working hypothesis to draw here is that even if all knowledge does not require 
the kind of cognitive achievement (i.e., cognitive success due to ability) the robust virtue 
epistemologist identifies with knowledge and so takes to be necessary for acquiring it, moral 
knowledge in particular does require this. For ease of reference, call this idea the Credit Condition 
on Moral Knowledge. 
Credit Condition on Moral Knowledge: S knows a moral proposition, pm only if S’s believing 
pm truly is primarily creditable to S’s exercise of (morally relevant) cognitive ability. 
 There are various ways that a credit condition on moral knowledge might be substantively 
glossed. For instance, those sympathetic to Hills’ (2009) thinking might insist that the abilities 




understanding.17 Alternatively, one might view these abilities referenced by the credit condition 
more standardly along virtue reliabilist lines.18 
 Either way, a credit condition on moral knowledge, no matter how the details are filled in, is 
going to carry with it an important commitment to thinking about defeat and knowledge 
asymmetrically in cases of moral and non-moral knowledge. In particular, an implication is that 
moral knowledge is going to be—at least in principle—less resilient to being undermined by 
defeaters than non-moral knowledge, and this comparative fragility is on account of its being more 
demanding. 
 To make this idea more concrete, consider the following case: 
COGNITIVE SABOTEUR: Through the exercise of his excellent moral reasoning, Theon 
comes to appreciate that selling high-risk subprime mortgages is morally wrong. 
Furthermore, through the exercise of his excellent math abilities, Theon comes to appreciate 
that Pythagoras’s theorem is true—viz., that the square of the hypotenuse of a triangle equals 
the sum of the squares of the other two sides. Unfortunately, Varys whispers to Theon 10 
confusing moral claims and 10 confusing mathematical claims, with the sole purpose of 
sabotaging Theon’s cognitive life. Varys’s testimony has destabilized Theon’s moral and 
mathematical abilities, which leads Theon to rightly begin to distrust them and even forget 
how to exercise them, even though—crucially—he retains his beliefs (which he now takes 
only on reliable testimony) that selling high-risk subprime mortgages is morally wrong and 
that Pythagoras’s theorem is true. 
 A first point to note is that, even without the mathematical abilities he had before, he can 
know that Pythagoras’s theorem (i.e., that the square of the hypotenuse of a triangle equals the sum 
of the squares of the other two sides) is true simply by continuing to trust mathematical experts.19 
However, while Varys’ testimony doesn’t defeat Theon’s mathematical knowledge, even if it has a 
deleterious effect on his mathematical abilities, it does seem to wreck not only Theon’s moral 
abilities (vis-à-vis the subprime mortgage proposition) but also, via the credit condition on moral 
knowledge, to defeat his moral knowledge. After all, these moral reasoning abilities are undermined 





 Fortunately, this difference in fragility is not particularly concerning—despite initial 
appearances—at least at the individual level where we are considering it presently. This is because 
abilities demanded by any plausible unpacking of the credit condition on moral knowledge must be 
stable in such a way that they will in practice withstand all but the strongest kinds of SABOTEUR-
style cases. 
 To see why this point holds, just consider how proponents of a credit condition on knowledge 
diagnose Plantinga’s (1993) brain-lesion case, in which an undetected brain lesion happens to 
reliably cause the subject, ‘Al’, to believe that has a brain lesion despite having no other evidence 
to support this. Is this an ability to which we can credit Al? If so, then (oddly) it looks as though 
Al’s believing truly that he has a brain lesion is primarily creditable to ability rather than, say, luck. 
But this seems too permissive; Al’s getting it right seems to have nothing to do with his abilities.20 
 The way that robust virtue epistemologists such as Greco have dealt with such cases is to 
insist that the kind of abilities that can generate knowledge must be, as he puts it, grounded in the 
subject’s cognitive character. According to Greco, this means they must: 
be (a) stable […] and (b) well integrated with other of the person’s cognitive dispositions … 
the cognitive process associated with the lesion is not well integrated with other aspects of 
the person’s cognition. The process produces only a single belief, for example, and it is 
unrelated and insensitive to other dispositions governing the formation and evaluation of 
belief (2010, 152). 
 This point about stability has an important ramification for how we should think about cases 
like COGNITIVE SABOTEUR. What’s important is that knowledge-generating abilities will be, in 
virtue of being well-integrated into the subject’s cognitive character, highly resilient to being 
undermined in the way described in COGNITIVE SABOTEUR. An implication is that whilst, say, 
testimony might suffice to undermine a poorly integrated disposition that falls short of bona fide 
ability by the lights of a plausible credit condition, the wrecking of well-integrated cognitive abilities 
(at least, at the individual level) through the acquisition of new beliefs will not be easy to do at all.21 
And this is welcome news: it means that—at the individual level, at least—the comparative 
asymmetry in resilience to defeat between moral and non-moral knowledge is unlikely to generate 
any serious skeptical threat to the (individual) moral knowledge we have. Things, however, are very 





III. COLLECTIVE MORAL KNOWLEDGE: PARITY PRINCIPLES 
Just as individuals know things, so do groups. For example, the FBI knows where the President is 
at all times. Chevrolet knows that airbags must be put in cars before they can be sold. CERN knows 
that the 125 GeV/c2 particle discovered in 2012 is a Higgs Boson.  
 On one way of thinking about what group knowledge involves, the above knowledge 
ascriptions come out true provided at least one (or perhaps several or most) individuals of the target 
group possesses the relevant item of knowledge. This view is called summativism: what’s key to 
summativism is that group knowledge reduces to individual knowledge.  
 Non-summativism, by contrast, is a more philosophically interesting way of thinking about 
group knowledge. According to non-summativism, which is gaining traction in social 
epistemology22, groups can have epistemic properties even if no individual in the group possesses 
them, including the property of knowledge.23 In the next section, we’ll review some of the standard 
ways in the non-summativist literature to make good on this idea (and how these connect with 
different ways of thinking about non-summativist moral knowledge, in particular). 
 But first we want to make explicit four assumptions that we will be making, and which allow 
us to engage in some new ways with puzzles that arise in connection with (non-summative) moral 
knowledge, disagreement and defeat. Firstly, we are going to assume that there is non-summativist 
knowledge. That is to say, we assume that there are group subjects that know things, where this 
group-level knowledge is not reducible to a summation of the individual knowledge of its 
members.24 Second, we are going to assume that there is not merely non-summativist non-moral 
knowledge, but also non-summativist moral knowledge—viz., that in some cases, a group can know 
a moral proposition.  
 The third and fourth assumptions will be the most important in what follows. The third 
assumption is what we’ll call ‘Parity Principle 1’: 
Parity Principle 1: If an individual S knows a moral proposition, pm only if S’s believing pm 
truly is primarily creditable to S’s exercise of (morally relevant) cognitive ability, then the 




 Parity Principle 1 is a special case of a more general parity principle that is more or less 
universally accepted in collective epistemology. This more principle says (roughly) that epistemic 
conditions (e.g., justification) on individual knowledge carry over, mutatis mutandis, to the 
collective level.25 What we’re calling Parity Principle 2 below is just another instance of the general 
principle: if individual moral knowledge requires that a credit condition be satisfied, then, mutatis 
mutandis, so does group moral knowledge. Parity Principle 1, in conjunction with the Credit 
Condition on Moral Knowledge, jointly imply ‘Parity Principle 2’: 
Parity Principle 2: A group g (non-summatively) knows a moral proposition, pm only if g’s 
believing pm truly is primarily creditable to g’s exercise of (morally relevant) cognitive 
ability. 
 Parity Principle 2 is, effectively, a group-level version of the individual credit condition on 
moral knowledge. The individual-level version of this principle—while it made moral knowledge 
easier to defeat than non-moral knowledge—did not do so substantially. This was due to the stability 
of individual level abilities of the sort that are capable of generating individual level knowledge. 
Whether the same holds for group-level knowledge remains to be seen. 
 
IV. COLLECTIVE MORAL KNOWLEDGE: TWO VARIETIES 
In this section, we first outline two strategies for fleshing out non-summativist knowledge, generally 
speaking: (i) the joint acceptance model and the (ii) distributed model. Then, for each account, we 
show in outline what it would take to countenance Parity Principle 2. Given the differences between 
the two accounts, the shape the credit condition will take in each case will be different. 
4.1 Joint-Acceptance Model 
According to the joint-acceptance model of group knowledge, knowledge is built out of group belief 
(e.g., Gilbert 1987; 2002; 2013). A group belief is, itself, a function of conditional commitments on 
the part of its individual members. The key features of the joint commitment account of group belief 
are as follows: 
Joint Acceptance-Belief (JAB): (i) A group, g, believes p iff the members of g jointly accept 




accept that p; (iii) members of g conditionally commit to accept that p when each is 
committed to acting as if p provided the others do. 
 For example, according to JAB, a jury believes that the defendant is guilty provided the 
members of the jury commit to act, in their capacities as jury members, as if the defendant is guilty. 
This will include voting ‘guilty’, e.g., by raising their hand at the appropriate time, responding in a 
way that is consonant with a guilty vote when queried by the foreman or judge, etc. Note that on 
Gilbert’s JAB model, this conditional commitment does not extend to the individual members’ 
believing the defendant is guilty in a private capacity, just to acting as if the client is guilty in their 
capacity as jurors.26 
 Nothing about JAB prevents a group from believing a proposition that is false; group 
knowledge, then, at least requires that the group belief be true, as well as justified. Notice, though, 
that the ‘justification’ of a JAB-style group belief won’t simply be a matter of the whether the 
individuals’ beliefs are justified.27 After all, as a non-summativist model, JAB (as per the jury 
example illustrates) does not require individual belief for group belief. 
 So what, then, is the source of group-level justification, when a group-level belief is 
justified? A natural answer here is a simple reliabilist answer, one that does not require additional 
group beliefs to function as group reasons.28 On the simple reliabilist model, a JAB-style group 
belief is justified just in case the process of joint acceptance is one that reliably gets to true beliefs.29 
On such a model, then, we might think of group knowledge provisionally as a JAB-style belief that 
is both true and which arises from truth-reliable joint acceptance. 
 There is, unfortunately, a lurking problem. Joint acceptance issues in group-level 
propositional outputs with both mind-to-world and world-to-mind directions of fit. In this way, it is 
importantly disanalogous from traditionally reliable belief-forming processes at the individual level 
(e.g., perception) which, when functioning normally, issue only mind-to-world outputs. As such, it’s 
not clear how ‘joint acceptance’ is plausibly a reliable process in a sense that would mimic the kind 
of reliable processes that we expect to issue in individual knowledge. 
 Jeroen de Ridder (2014) proposes a way to get around this problem. Taking scientific group 
knowledge as a paradigm for group knowledge, de Ridder maintains that a group is justified in 




where a process of inquiry implicates a joint commitment to getting to the truth about whether or 
not p. This  caveat avoids the worry facing a flat-footed reliability account because, while 
unqualified ‘joint acceptance’ as a process type isn’t a viable candidate for reliability, specifically 
inquiry-directed joint acceptance by comparison is. Even more, de Ridder’s basing condition closes 
an important potential gap between the doxastic output issued by joint acceptance of the group and 
the reliable inquiry-directed process. 
 Let’s suppose that something like de Ridder’s account is on the right track and that, e.g., 
with suitable supplementation with an anti-Gettier proviso, it offers a workable non-summativist 
account of group knowledge built out of JAB-style group belief. Even if these assumptions are 
granted, it follows from Parity Principle 2 that additional conditions will be needed to be satisfied 
if the group is to have specifically moral knowledge.  
 After all, the credit condition that features in Parity Principle 2 isn’t going to be secured 
simply through a basing condition such as de Ridder’s, viz., where the relevant group output must 
be based on a reliable inquiry-directed process. For one thing, not all processes are abilities (as the 
discussion of cognitive integration in §2 reveals at the individual level). And so, what follows from 
Parity Principle 2 is that a workable JAB account needs to be supplemented with a further account 
of group ability if it is to countenance group knowledge. For another, such an account of group 
ability needs to be put to work in the account in such a way that the account can explain how (when 
a group knows a moral proposition) the group ability is what primarily explains why the group’s 
doxastic output is true. 
4.2 A Distributed Model 
On a distributed model on non-summativist group knowledge, a group can know something even 
though none of the individuals knows it, and even if the group doesn’t jointly commit to the 
proposition in the way required by JAB. What’s important, on the distributed model, is principally 
that the group generates propositional outputs in a reliable way. 
 For example, on Alexander Bird (2010)’s model, what’s key to group knowledge is that the 
group plays functional roles that are analogous to the knowledge-generating cognitive powers of 
individuals.30 In particular, according to Bird, group knowers will have the following properties: 




(ii) they have characteristic mechanisms whose function is to ensure or promote the chances 
that the outputs in (i) are true (truth-filtering); 
(iii) the outputs in (i) are the inputs for (a) social actions or for (b) social cognitive structures 
(including the very same structure) (function of outputs) (2010, 43-4). 
 A group, for Bird, is functionally integrated when there is dependence between them for their 
own proper functioning, and such dependence is what determines group membership. This is of 
starkly different from the Gilbert-style requirement of joint commitment. One similarity, though, 
concerns a broadly reliabilist requirement that features in both models. On the JAB model (glossed 
with de Ridder’s justification condition), the reliability requirement on group knowledge is a matter 
of a group belief’s being properly based on a reliable process of inquiry. On a distributed model like 
Bird’s, the reliability requirement is captured in clause (ii)—viz., Bird’s truth-filtering requirement. 
 Let’s now assume for the sake of argument that Bird’s account—supplemented with a 
suitable anti-Gettier proviso—offers a viable account of non-summativist distributed group 
knowledge. Even if this is assumed, it follows from Parity Principle 2, that an additional credit 
condition will be needed to be satisfied if the group is to have specifically moral knowledge, and 
not merely non-moral knowledge.  
 What would it take to satisfy this further credit condition on a distributed model? Given that 
it’s possible for all of Bird’s conditions to be met while the credit condition is not met, further 
elaboration is needed. One suggestion here can be extracted from recent work on group knowledge 
by S. Orestis Palermos (2015). Palermos, in discussing the conditions under which group knowledge 
might be an achievement on virtue reliabilist lines, proposes a kind of modal condition according to 
which “getting to the truth of the matter as to whether p (or not-p) could only be collectively achieved 
and is thereby creditable only to the group as a whole.31” Transposed to the language of Bird’s 
model: getting to the truth of the matter as to whether p (for some moral proposition p) is primarily 
creditable to g’s exercise of a (morally) relevant ability if and only if the group’s truth-filtering 
mechanisms are not only sufficient but also necessary for getting to the truth of the matter as to 
whether p. 
 With this kind of supplement, then, we can in principle make sense of differential demands 
within a distributed model for (i) non-moral knowledge; and (ii) moral knowledge, respectively, 





V. COLLECTIVE MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND DEFEAT: TWO NEGATIVE RESULTS 
In this section, we want to show how both the accounts of group knowledge sketched in §4—viz., 
the joint acceptance and distributive accounts—face a dilemma concerning higher-order defeat: in 
short, each turns out to be able to accommodate group-level moral knowledge only by making such 
knowledge problematically fragile.3233  
5.1 Joint commitment model 
Recall that, on a JAB-style account of group knowledge, it needs to be clear how—when a group 
knows a moral proposition—a group ability is what primarily explains why the group’s doxastic 
output is true. But how, exactly, is a group going to acquire any abilities it might have on a joint-
acceptance model? 
 Miranda Fricker (2010) offers a suggestion. In her work on collective character traits, Fricker 
shows how we can make room for collective character virtues within a Gilbert-style joint-acceptance 
model, according to which joint acceptance is what fixes the non-summative properties of a group. 
On Fricker’s proposal, a group g has a collective character virtue when the members of g jointly 
commit to a good motive as a body. For instance, in the case of a committee, a committee that jointly 
commits to being open-minded or impartial when undertaking some task type, T, can be considered 
open-minded vis-à-vis that task type. It is contestable whether character virtues must themselves be 
reliable.34 Abilities, at least those that are knowledge-generating, on the other hand, must be. Though 
a reliability requirement can naturally be incorporated into the kind of character account Fricker is 
proposing: the idea in short is that a group has an ability just in case it (i) jointly commits to achieving 
some good end, where ‘good’ is relative to a given domain (e.g., moral, epistemic, aesthetic, etc.); 
and (ii) is reliably enough successful at bringing this good end about.  
 On this kind of a template view, then, a JAB model could accommodate Parity Principle 2 
by insisting that when a group knows a moral proposition, what primarily explains why the group’s 
doxastic output is true is a group ability that is, itself, fixed in part by by joint commitments to 
achieving some epistemically good end.  
 Unfortunately, no matter how we fill in further details with this proposal, there is a looming 




DISAGREEMENT:35 A bioethics policy committee, C, is tasked with determining whether 
it is morally acceptable to use BrainEx technology to perform a perfusion on a dead human 
brain.36 The committee (with reference to JAB) jointly commits to two things: firstly, they 
jointly commit to investigating the matter of whether performing such perfusions is morally 
acceptable in an intellectually rigorous and open-minded way that accords with scientific 
standards; then—following their detailed investigation—the group makes a second joint 
commitment: to the truth of the proposition that using BrainEx Technology to perform a 
perfusion on a dead human brain is not morally acceptable. During the course of the 
committee’s deliberation, one of the committee’s members (member A) registered 
reservations about how the committee was weighing evidence about what counts as ‘brain 
death’, and this led to a disagreement with another member, member B. But A agreed with 
B and the rest that the total evidence overwhelmingly supported what the group jointly 
committed to (e.g., that such perfusions are not morally acceptable); thus, A joined the rest 
in the eventual joint commitment that was made. 
A first thing to note about the DISAGREEMENT case is that it (assuming for the sake of argument 
that the target proposition is true) looks like about as good a candidate for non-summativist moral 
knowledge within a JAB framework as you could expect to encounter in practice. It is, after all, not 
reasonable to expect that there will be no disagreements whatsoever between a group about such 
things as the how certain kinds of evidence (in this case, concerning usage of the term ‘brain death’) 
should be interpreted scientifically. 
 But, even so—and here is the crux of the problem—the kind of dispute we find in 
DISAGREEMENT about the standards being used to evaluate the evidence turns out to be enough 
to defeat the group’s moral knowledge. The reasoning here is as follows: the defeasibility conditions 
for group ability on a JAB model are highly fragile. If, in DISAGREEMENT, some members submit 
during the course of the group investigation that the group is not following agreed-to scientific 
standards, then it trivially follows that (at least) some members are not acting in their capacity as 
group members as if the group is following such standards. But since joint commitments are on the 
JAB model conditional commitments this means that even minority dissent has the power to release 




 Of course, a tempting gloss of the situation just described is to emphasize that the minority 
dissent that features in in DISAGREEMENT is just a kind of ‘higher-order’ disagreement about the 
methods used by to group to reach its conclusion. There was no first-order disagreement within the 
group about the truth of target proposition itself. But, crucially, an attempt to minimize the epistemic 
significance of this (even lone) higher-order dispute is simply not on the table if Parity Principle 2 
is to be upheld. Parity Principle 2, to reiterate, articulates a sense in which moral knowledge of a 
group must be creditable primarily to group ability (which we’ve fleshed out on the joint acceptance 
model along Fricker’s lines). Whenever that ability is undermined, then so, thereby, is group moral 
knowledge. And this is the case even if undermining a group ability is not sufficient for undermining 
non-moral group knowledge. So long as a lone higher-order disagreement within a group can suffice 
to undermine group ability, then it can suffice to undermine group moral knowledge. 
 What we find, then, is an important disanalogy between the comparative fragility of (i) 
individual moral knowledge; and (ii) group moral knowledge, at least when group moral knowledge 
is theorized about within a joint commitment framework. A proponent of a joint-commitment model 
is forced to make a choice that (as we’ve suggested in §2) a proponent of individual moral 
knowledge is not forced to make. The choice is: (i) Either give up the idea that group moral 
knowledge requires ability in a way that non-moral knowledge does not (i.e., give up Parity Principle 
2) and sever the connection at the group level between moral knowledge and ability that we find 
well motivated at the individual level, or accept Parity Principle 2 and accept that group moral 
knowledge is highly fragile37, so fragile that it will be likely to be undermined in cases that feature 
even outlying higher-order disagreement of the sort we find in DISAGREEMENT. Either route is 
problematic.    
 
5.2 The distributive model 
A variation on the dilemma just sketched faces a proponent of distributed group moral knowledge. 
As we showed in §4.2, it’s possible for all of Bird’s conditions to be met while the credit condition 
implied by Parity Principle 2 is not met. The elaboration suggested, drawing from work by Palermos 
(2015), was as follows: a group g knows a moral proposition only if the group’s truth-filtering 
mechanisms are not only sufficient but also necessary for getting to the truth of the matter as to 




 The combination of Bird’s distributed account of group knowledge with a Palermos-style 
construal of a credit condition captures an important intuition about credit: the group deserves the 
credit if no subset of individuals could get the desired result alone. And, indeed, in some cases of 
moral knowledge, that will be the case, especially perhaps difficult moral knowledge (e.g., as in the 
case of DISAGREEMENT, or perhaps even in the scientific case of CERN discovering the Higgs 
Boson through widely distributed collaboration).  
 The view, however, struggles when it comes to making sense of easy moral knowledge. To 
make this idea concrete, consider the following case:  
CREDIT SWAMP: A bioethics policy committee, C, is tasked with determining whether it 
is morally acceptable to allow, as a method of deterrence, the whipping of young children in 
hospitals who do not follow the doctors’ advice. The committee realize that this will be a 
short meeting. In a manner that satisfies all of Birds’ three conditions—including a truth-
filtering condition—the committee, working collaboratively and through the normal 
distribution of tasks across committee members, produces a (very) prompt and professional 
report detailing why the answer is ‘no’.  
CREDIT SWAMP looks ex ante like a clear-cut case of distributed moral knowledge. The problem 
is that there’s no straightforward way for a proponent of distributed knowledge to make sense of 
this while, at the same time, upholding Parity Principle 2. In short, the situation is this: it’s simply 
false that, in CREDIT SWAMP getting the right result could only be collectively achieved. Granted, 
the tasks are in fact distributed across the members of the group as in a typical case of distributed 
knowledge, but given how easy the moral question is under consideration, any one individual we 
may assume would have been able to get this correct result (i.e., that children shouldn’t be whipped, 
even if it were a successful deterrent!). But once this point is appreciated, the prospects that the 
credit condition in this case is satisfied look dim: after all, the truth-filtering mechanisms of the 
group were on display here, but is the group’s getting it right primarily creditable to this distributed 
mechanism? It’s not true that the result could only have been collectively achieved through such 
collective mechanisms. Given the widespread agreement both in individual beliefs and individual 
abilities, each has suitable epistemic coverage to do the relevant cognitive work that other members 




 The proponent of distributed moral knowledge might press back against our dilemma and 
simply deny that any moral knowledge is easy moral knowledge. Perhaps, as this line of thought 
would go, all moral knowledge is difficult. We reject this claim. However, our response to the worry 
doesn’t require that we do. In fact, all that’s needed to generate problems for a proponent of 
distributed knowledge who wants to uphold Parity Principle 2 is to point out that some moral 
knowledge is easy enough to come by that a collective effort is not needed to achieve it, even if a 
collective effort is used to achieve it. Our CREDIT SWAMP case is meant to be such an example—
e.g., where the distributed filtering abilities are reliable and in fact used to get to the truth but—
given the wide coverage of the individual abilities and beliefs that bear on the target proposition—
superfluous.    
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Our overarching aim here has been to motivate some new puzzles to do with defeat in collective 
moral epistemology, puzzles which have ultimately revealed collective moral knowledge to be 
surprisingly fragile compared to individual-level moral knowledge. We take as a starting point, in 
individual epistemology, a distinction between (i) moral knowledge, and (i) the kind of (non-moral) 
knowledge that is easily transferable by testimony. On the assumption that there is moral knowledge, 
we’ve argued that the best way to countenance it is with reference to the kind of ‘credit condition’ 
that robust virtue epistemologists, albeit mistakenly, think that all knowledge, moral as well as non-
moral, must answer to. We then argued, by parity, from the individual to the collective level as 
follows: if moral knowledge demands the satisfaction of a credit condition at the individual level, 
then the same should hold at the collective level. In particular, the key ‘parity principle’ we defend 
maintains the following: that a group g (non-summatively) knows a moral proposition, pm only if 
g’s believing pm truly is primarily creditable to g’s exercise of (morally relevant) cognitive ability. 
 With this parity principle in play, we then outlined the two most prominent template accounts 
of non-summativist moral knowledge: the joint acceptance account, notably defended by Gilbert, 
and the distributed model, defended by Bird. We showed what it would take to satisfy the credit 
parity principle on moral knowledge on each of these accounts, with reference to their substantive 
differences. The upshot was, in each case, a dilemma an analogue to which we don’t find at the 




knowledge in a way that satisfies the parity principle only at a substantial cost—viz., by making 
group level moral knowledge highly fragile, so fragile that (it was argued) a single intragroup dispute 
about methodology would (in the case DISAGREEMENT) be sufficient for undermining it. 
Distributed accounts faced a similar dilemma: for proponents of distributed group moral knowledge, 
the dilemma was to either reject the parity principle (and thus sever the connection at the group level 
between moral knowledge and credit that we find well motivated at the individual level) or retain 
that connection and accept that group moral knowledge is undermined (via ‘credit swamping’) 
whenever the moral knowledge at issue is too easy to require a collective effort.  
 These puzzles place the burden of argument on non-skeptical collective moral 
epistemologists to show us how (non-summativist) knowledge is possible, and in a way that avoids 
serious theoretical costs. We hope to have shown what some of these costs are, and what kinds of 
considerations the non-skeptical collective moral epistemologist will need to grapple with in order 
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1 For some recent critiques of moral pessimism, see for example Sliwa (2012) and Enoch (2014). 
2 See, e.g., Hills (2009), Hopkins (2007) and Lillehammer (2014). 
3  For a more thorough discussion of moral testimony, moral deference and its relationship to higher-order 
evidence, see Lee, Robson and Sinclair (this volume). 
4 See Lackey (2007) and Pritchard (2012). Cf., Greco (2012) for a reply. 
5 See Nickel (2001) and Hills (2009) for developments of such an ‘understanding reply’ to the problem of moral 
deference. 
6 There is also logical space for the line that one epistemically should not have (mere) moral knowledge. Because 
this conflicts with platitude that knowledge is at least epistemically permissible, we’ll bracket this possibility. 
7 Kallestrup (forthcoming) maintains that all collective knowledge requires collective achievement. 
8 It is, however, difficult to acquire on the two models for very different reasons.   
9 See, e.g., Mackie (1977) and Olson (2014). 
10 We say ‘traditionally construed’ because it is available to the non-cognitivist to embrace, along with ethical non-
cognitivism, also epistemic non-cognitivism, according to which knowledge attributions are expressions of 
epistemic approval. For discussion of this kind of a view, see Chrisman (2012). 
11 Similar examples have been raised in recent work in the epistemology of know-how. See, for example, Carter 
and Pritchard (2015) and Poston (2016). 
12 For discussion of grasping as a kind of ability, see Kvanvig (2013) and Grimm (2014). 
13 This is of course not to imply that moral knowledge is always or even generally more difficult than non-moral 
knowledge to acquire. Some non-moral knowledge is obviously more difficult to acquire than some of the easiest 
moral knowledge (e.g., Goldbach’s conjecture versus the wrongness of gratuitous evil). Rather, the idea is that 
moral knowledge categorically requires ability in a way that non-moral knowledge does not.   
14 See, for example, Greco (2010; 2012) and Sosa (2009; 2015) for representative defences; cf., Zagzebski (1996) 
for a stronger version of the position which requires that these abilities be not only reliable dispositions, but also 
that they feature distinctive motivations. 
15  See, for example, Greco (2010, Ch. 6), Sosa (2010), Turri (2011), and Carter (2016) for representative 
discussions. Robust virtue epistemology also has the advantage of explaining why knowledge, qua achievement, 
has the kind of value often ascribed to it. For discussion, see Pritchard et al. (2014). 
16 For related points, see Pritchard (2012) and Kallestrup and Pritchard (2014). 
17 See, for example, Hills (2015) for a development on the view of abilities and moral understanding from her 
(2009). 
18 See, for example, Sosa (2010) for an account of virtue reliabilist abilities as competences, which are dispositions 
with three components: seat/shape/situation (see also Sosa (2015)). A canonical presentation of virtue reliabilist 
abilities is given in Greco (2010).  
19 For discussion, see Graham (2006). While the idea that one can know mathematical propositions via testimony 
is widely accepted in the epistemology of testimony, it is contentious in the philosophy of mathematics, according 
to which proof is required for knowledge. Thanks to Justin Clarke-Doane for raising this point.  
20 What goes for Al plausibly goes for other kinds of ‘meta-incoherence’ cases in the classic reliabilist literature. 
For discussion, see, e.g., Sosa (2000). 
21 For a recent discussion of how abilities can be defeated, see Carter and Navarro (2017), who engage with this 
issue in the context of anti-intellectualism about know-how. 
22 See Gilbert (2014) for an overview.  
23 See especially the collections of papers in Lackey (ed.) (2014) and Brady and Fricker (eds.) (2016). 
24 See, along with Lackey (ed.) 2014, and Brady and Fricker (eds.) (2016), Gilbert (2014). 
25 Note that ‘belief’ is not an epistemic condition, per se. 
26 For critical discussion on this point, see Mathiesen (2006) and Carter (2015). 
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in an account of group justification. For a criticism of Lackey’s account, see Silva (2018). 
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30  See Bird (2010, §4.3) for discussion of how this kind of functionalist approach draws from Durkheim’s 
functionalism and the organismic analogy. 
31 Our italics. 
32 DiPaolo (this volume) discusses how a group of fanatics, given their dogmatic beliefs, might be more resilient 
to higher-order defeat than other more epistemically virtuous groups. 
33 For a more precise characterization of higher-order evidence which is congenial to the project we pursue here, 
see Bernett (this volume, section 2). 
34 This is a topic of longstanding debate in individual epistemology, in the literature on virtue responsibilism. See, 
for example, Montmarquet (1992), Zagzebski (1996) and Baehr (2011).  
35 For the sceptical significance of moral disagreement as an instance of higher-order evidence, see Terman and 
Risberg (this volume). See also Turnbull and Sampson (this volume) for a steadfast account of moral disagreement. 
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